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Beyond the Soul and Virtue:




Readers of Stoic ethics may find ‘benefit’ (ōpheleia) an essential but
enigmatic concept. It directly connects to some critical terms of Stoic
ethics, such as ‘good’ and ‘virtue,’ but there is no extant discussion of a
definition. Beyond the superficial connections, what makes ‘benefit’
beneficial? Why is benefit a good thing? I argue that these essential
questions remain unanswerable for a good reason: Stobaeus committed to
a specious claim about benefit in his Anthology, which has misguided
later commentaries. Either the Stoics themselves made a stronger contrast
between sages and inferior people at the cost of coherence, or Stobaeus
simply mischaracterized the Stoics’ ideas in his descriptions. This paper
aims to clarify Stobaeus’s inaccurate description and reconstruct a
coherent and comprehensible interpretation of benefit in the Stoic spirit,
with the help of Stoic cosmology. To benefit is to further nature’s
agreement. Given the available evidence, I argue that Stoics seem to, or
should, be committed to my interpretation. This paper is structured as
follows. Section 1 offers a quick background of Stoic ethics. Section 2
discusses two important characteristics of benefit. Section 3 discusses
Stobaeus’s description of benefit and inferior people. Section 4 attempts
an interpretation of benefit. Finally, Section 5 discusses Inwood and
Gerson’s interpretation and argues that it is inadequate.
1. Background: Virtue, Sage, and Appropriate Action
The Stoic value system divides things into three categories: the good, the bad, and
the indifferents. The virtues ( aretē) are good, including “prudence, justice, courage,
moderation, and the rest”. The vices (kakia) are bad, including “foolishness,2
2 Diogenes Laertius, 7.101–3,  in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 58A.
1 Yunlong Cao is pursuing a combined graduate degree in philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. His main
philosophical interests are epistemology, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.
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injustice, and the rest”. The indifferents (adiaphora) include everything else, such as3
“life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, noble birth, and their
opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, low repute, ignoble
birth and the like…”. Though we may often prefer some indifferents over their4
opposites—e.g., life over death—the preferred indifferents are far less important
than virtues.
The Stoics also divide people into two categories. The sages (sophos) are virtuous,
wise, and happy all at once. Sages are always happy because “happiness consists in5
virtue since virtue is a soul which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the
whole of life”. In addition, sages possess all virtues. “Menedemus of Eretria6
eliminated the plurality and the differentiations of the virtues, holding that there is a
single one, called by many names; for it is the same thing that is called moderation
and courage and justice, like ‘mortal’ and ‘man’”. Furthermore, sages never make7
mistakes, not because they know everything in the world, but because they know
when to withhold judgement if a mistake is possible. According to Stobaeus, “They
[the Stoics] say that the wise man [a sage] never makes a false supposition, and that
he does not assent at all to anything incognitive, owing to his not opining and his
being ignorant of nothing”. In brief, the Stoics set the bar to be a sage so high that8
only few in humanity have ever achieved virtue.
The rest of us are all inferior people (phaulos). For the Stoics, if one is not virtuous9
and wise, then he is vicious, silly, inferior, and base. One cannot be partly virtuous
and partly inferior. Diogenes offered an illustration — “a stick must be either
straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, but not either more just or
more unjust, and likewise with the other virtues”. Oddly, the Stoics would call the10
vast majority of humanity inferior and vicious; however, this does not mean that
nobody can do anything right. With some help from luck or the advice of sages, we
non-sages are still capable of appropriate actions (kathēkonta), “which [have] an
affinity with arrangements that are according to nature.” Appropriate actions are11
the best actions in a given circumstance. Even better than appropriate actions are the
11 Diogenes, 7.108, in The Stoic Reader, 101.108.
10 Diogenes, 7.127, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 61I.
9 ‘Inferior’ could be considered harsh by the general public, but it appropriately captures the negative
connotations of the Greek term phaulos. Admittedly, calling almost everyone vicious or inferior is one
of the strange things about Stoic ethics.
8 Stobaeus, 2.111,18–112,8, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 41G.
7 Plutarch, “On Moral Virtue”, 440E–441D, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 61B. For an explanation on
the inter-entailment of virtues, see Bett 2012, p. 533.
6 Diogenes, 7.89 in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 61A.
5 I follow Prof. Richard Bett in using the gender-neutral translations, ‘sages’ and ‘inferior people’,
instead of the traditional gendered translations, “wise men” and “base men”. For an argument for the
gender-neutral translations, see Bett 2012, p. 531. For an argument against the gender-neutral
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right actions (katorthōmata), a special kind of appropriate actions done by the sages
according to their virtues.
The Stoics take these two theses to be compatible: 1) Inferior people can make
progress towards virtue; 2) All inferior people are equally inferior. Plutarch quoted
an illustration: “just as in the sea the man an arm’s length from the surface is
drowning no less than the one who has sunk five hundred fathoms, so even those
who are getting close to virtue are no less in a state of vice than those who are far
from it”. Inferior people closer to virtue may perform more appropriate actions, but12
their soul is in the same inferior state with other inferior people. According to
Chrysippus, “The man who progresses to the furthest point performs all proper
functions [i.e., appropriate actions] without exception and omits none”. Though13
inferior people are all equally vicious, one can, in some sense, make progress
towards virtue by performing more and more appropriate actions. Furthermore,
“virtue is teachable… as is evident from the fact that inferior men become good [i.e.,
virtuous people]”. Though the Stoics set a high bar for virtue, they are still14
optimistic that inferior people can become sages.
2. Two Characteristics of the Stoic Conception of Benefit
This section aims to locate ‘benefit’ in the Stoic conceptual framework. There are two
main characteristics of benefit agreed upon and emphasized by the Stoics. First,
benefit is defined by virtue. Diogenes wrote that “to benefit is to change (kinein) or
maintain (ischein) something in accordance with virtue, whereas to harm is to change
or maintain something in accordance with vice.” If an action is done per one’s15
virtue, someone receives some benefit from this action. Moreover, benefit helps
define good. Sextus Empiricus wrote that “the Stoics, sticking fast to the common
conceptions so to speak, define the good as follows: “Good is benefit or not other
than benefit, meaning by ‘benefit’ virtue and virtuous action… For virtue, which is a
disposition of the commanding-faculty, and virtuous action, which is an activity in
accordance with virtue, are benefit directly.” Benefit is virtue or virtuous action,16
and it is the only genuinely favourable action. The Stoics emphasized that benefit is
related to virtue and virtue alone. Preferred indifferents, such as health and wealth,
might serve as means of virtuous actions. For example, a sage can give to charity
according to her virtue. However, what really benefits is the sage’s virtuous action,
not the money she gave.
16 Sextus Empiricus, “Against the professors”, 11.22–6, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 60G.
15 Diogenes, 7.102, in The Stoics Reader, 101.102.
14 Diogenes, 7.91, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 61K. The Stoic definition of ‘good’ includes virtuous
people. See The Hellenistic Philosophers, 60G.
13 Stobaeus, 5.906,18–907,5, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 59I.
12 Plutarch, “On Common Conceptions”, 1063A–B, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 61T.
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Second, the Stoics also emphasized that benefit is common (koinos). Stobaeus wrote
that “all goods are common to the virtuous, and all that is bad to the inferior.
Therefore a man who benefits someone also benefits himself, and one who does
harm also harms himself. All virtuous men benefit one another … but the foolish are
in the opposite situation.” Benefit is shared by all virtuous people. Thus, a virtuous17
action does not only benefit an individual or a small group, but every virtuous
person simultaneously. I will address two alternative interpretations of Stobaeus’s
quote.
One may explain the commonness of benefit as a result of the social practices of the
virtuous. Contingently, sages only benefit but never harm each other. If sage Alex
benefits sage Bailey today, Bailey will benefit Alex back tomorrow; sages always
choose to benefit each other. Although this interpretation captures sages in
interaction, it does not explain Stobaeus’s description that: “all virtuous men benefit
each other, even though they are not in all cases friends of each other or well
disposed [to each other] … because they do not have a [cognitive] grasp of each
other and do not live in the same place.” Sages can benefit each other without even18
knowing each other. If we interpret common benefit as merely reciprocal, then sages
have to pick out specific benefit receivers for each virtuous action, which requires
interaction. However, Stobaeus argued that interaction is not required for benefit
between sages. Therefore, interpreting common benefit as reciprocal social practices
is inadequate.
Another explanation of the commonness of benefit appeals to the structure of souls
and actions: if sages benefit someone, they also benefit their own souls. For example,
if sage Catherine benefits sage Dive with a virtuous action, she also benefits herself
by making her soul more virtuous. Although this interpretation captures the Stoic
emphasis on the soul, it leads to a dilemma: nobody can benefit and improve their
soul at the same time. Sages can benefit, but they already have perfect souls for they
are perfectly virtuous. How can they further improve their soul beyond perfection?
Inferior people can make progress, but they neither possess virtue nor can perform
virtuous actions. How can they benefit anyone? I will further argue against this
interpretation in Section 5.
3. A Tension in the Descriptions: Can Inferior People Receive Benefit?
Stobaeus did not think inferior people can receive benefit. He explicitly wrote that
“no base man [i.e., an inferior person] either benefits or is benefited.” By definition,19
inferior people are not virtuous; thus, they cannot benefit because they cannot act
19 Stobaeus, “Anthology, 2.11’, in The Stoics Reader, 102.11d.
18 Stobaeus, “Anthology, 2.11”, in The Stoics Reader, 102.11i.
17 Stobaeus, 2.101,21–102,3, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 60P.
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per their nonexistent virtue. However, I argue that Stobaeus’s commitment that
inferior people cannot be benefited is mistaken and untenable for three reasons. Once
this commitment is corrected, we will be in a position to understand benefit.
3.1 A Sage-Inferior-Person Interaction
First, Stobaeus cannot explain a sage-inferior person (hereafter, SIP) interaction. “All
virtuous men benefit one another … but the foolish are in the opposite situation.”20
When two sages interact, they benefit each other; when two inferior people interact,
they harm each other. This characterization does delineate a clear contrast between
sages and inferior people. However, what happens when a sage interacts with an
inferior person? They cannot benefit each other: the inferior person cannot be
benefited; they cannot harm each other: the sage cannot be harmed. However,
benefit and harm are supposed to be common. How can Stobaeus make sense of a
SIP interaction? Is such interaction possible?
One possible response is acknowledging the possibility of such interaction but
denying that benefit and harm are reciprocal between sages and inferior people. The
sage receives benefit, but the inferior person receives harm. However, this
interpretation suggests that it is virtuous for sages to ‘take advantage’ of the inferior
people. If a sage knows their interaction can only harm the inferior, will it still be
virtuous for her to interact with the inferior person? Though the sage is benefited,
would the Stoics be willing to accept such selfish actions as ethical and virtuous?
Harm, like benefit, is not about indifferents but about souls. Therefore, the Stoics
cannot simply dismiss this harm as trivial, rendering this response problematic.
The other possible response is to deny the possibility of a SIP interaction. One
possible argument is that sages and inferior people cannot interact because sages are
rare. If there were no sages alive while Stobaeus was writing, they could not interact
with inferior people. Another possible argument is that virtuous people tend to live
together and perhaps in one city. In such cases, the separation between sages and
inferior people dismisses the theoretical tension within SIP interactions. Neither
inferior people are benefited, nor are sages harmed, due to the lack of interaction.
However, I argue that the appeal to the separation between sages and inferior people
is not only inadequate to resolve this tension, but also goes against the Stoic spirit.
This separation lacks the modal strength to provide a theoretical solution to the
tension. It could at most describe what is happening in the world: most inferior
people do not know many sages, so they are not often benefited. However, this
statistical generality does not suggest that inferior people cannot be benefited.
Furthermore, this separation conflicts with the Stoic view of the community. Cicero
20 Stobaeus, 2.101,21-102,3, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 60P.
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wrote that “we are driven by nature to desire to benefit as many people as
possible…”. Separating sages and inferior people into two different worlds21
prevents sages from benefiting as many people as possible. Hierocles argued that
one should care about the entire human race with his illustration of concentric
circles. He wrote that “the outermost and largest circle, which encompasses all the
rest, is that of the whole human race…it is the task of a well tempered man, in his
proper treatment of each group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the
centre…”. The Stoics teach people to concern themselves with the whole human22
race, and thus separating sages and inferior people is against the Stoic spirit.
SIP interactions are necessary for Stoicism. If we allow that inferior people can be
benefited, sages can interact with inferior people and hence benefit them in
accordance with their virtues.
3.2 The Logic of Stobaeus’s Description
Stobaeus might not have meant to argue that inferior people cannot be benefited,
because the supporting sentence does not entail the claim. He wrote that “…no base
man [i.e., an inferior person] either benefits or is benefited. For benefiting is <to
change> or maintain something in accordance with virtue, and being benefited is to
be changed in accordance with virtue”. The conjunctive “for,” suggests that the23
latter sentence supports the former. However, this support falls short of an
entailment. I reconstruct his argument in standard form:
(P1) Benefiting is <to change> or maintain something in accordance
with virtue.
(P2) Inferior people cannot change or maintain something in accordance
with virtue.
(C3) Thus, inferior people cannot benefit.
This argument is sound because the implicit assumption (P2) is true. Inferior people
do not possess virtue; therefore, they cannot act in accordance with virtue. Consider
the other argument:
(P4) Being benefited is to be changed in accordance with virtue.
(P5) Inferior people cannot be changed in accordance with virtue.
(C6) Thus, inferior people cannot be benefited.
23 Ibid. Please note that “angle brackets < > represent material supplied by the editors [i.e., Inwood
and Gerson] of the original Greek and Latin texts to repair a gap in the ancient text caused by damage
or omission by scribes in the course of transmission” (“Abbreviations and Conventions”, in The Stoics
Reader).
22 Hierocles, qtd. in Stobaeus 4.671,7–673,11, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 57G.
21 Cicero, “On Ends, 3.62-8”, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 57F.
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This argument is unsound because the implicit assumption (P5) is false. Nothing
intrinsically prevents an inferior person from being changed in accordance with
virtue. Whether an action is in accordance with virtue depends on the subject instead
of the object. If the subject is virtuous, the action is guaranteed to be virtuous. The
vice of an object cannot override the subject’s virtue.
“To change or maintain'' can have different interpretations. A stronger interpretation
requires a causal role of the action. For example, a sage gives some advice to an
inferior person. If the inferior people would act otherwise without the sage’s advice,
then the sage changed or maintained something. A weaker interpretation requires an
action to change something in the modal strength. In this example, if the inferior
people would perform an appropriate action without the sage’s advice, but the
sage’s advice made the appropriate action more likely, then it changed or maintained
something. Since the Stoics emphasized the modal strength of one’s reasoning
behnnd actions, as evidenced by their distinction between appropriate and right
actions, I suggest the weaker interpretation. However, the sage can benefit the
inferior people on both interpretations. They just do so slightly less often when we
adopt the stronger interpretation.
3.3 Clement’s Description of God’s Benefit
Stobaeus’s commitment conflicts with an argument made by another Stoic — Saint
Clement of Alexandria — that God benefits everyone. He argued that “God is
agreed to be good; therefore god benefits. But the good in so far as it is good does
nothing but benefit; therefore god benefits everything… therefore god cares for and
attends to man”. God benefits everyone, virtuous and inferior alike. If benefit is24
only available among the virtuous, how can God benefit the inferior people?
One possible response is that God’s benefit and humans’ benefit are two different
notions. Humans can only benefit sages, but gods can benefit everyone. However,
this is incorrect because the distinction conflicts with the idea that god(s) and
virtuous humans benefit each other equally. Plutarch wrote that “according to
Chrysippus… Zeus does not surpass Dion [i.e., a random name of a sage] in virtue,
and Zeus and Dion are benefited equally by each other when one meets with a
motion of the other since they are [both] wise”. God(s) and virtuous humans25
benefit each other equally because they do not differ in virtue. Thus, there is only
one kind of benefit in a god-sage interaction. Furthermore, the direct connection
between virtue and gods’ benefit suggests that there is only one concept of benefit.
The Stoics were not equivocating two notions of benefit.
25 Plutarch, “On Common Conceptions”, 1076A, in The Stoics Reader, 32.
24 Clement, “The Teacher”, 1.8.63.1–2, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 60I.
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A worry is that Saint Clement, a Christian theologian, could have appropriated the
Stoic term for his own purpose. Stoics could have argued that inferior people could
not receive benefit, which is against the Christian spirit that God benefits everyone.
Thus, Clement altered the meaning of benefit slightly to be compatible with
Christian ideas. Therefore, we should not regard Clement’s description as evidence
of this particular interpretation of Stoic ideas. I think that we should interpret
Clement’s argument with caution, possibly as “applied Stoicism,” because of his
Christian influence. However, we should also not completely disregard this
evidence, because Clement’s argument’s conceptual relation between ‘good’ and
‘benefit’ matches the one in other Stoics’ descriptions. As I quoted before, Clement
argued that “God is agreed to be good; therefore God benefits”. There is a direct26
connection between the concepts of good and benefit, which matches the Stoic
definition of good as “benefit or not other than benefit”. This agreement suggests27
that relations between concepts in Clement’s description are isomorphic to relations
between concepts in descriptions by other Stoics: if Clement appropriated the Stoic
concept of benefit, he must also have appropriated good and virtue. Thus, it still
supports that inferior people could be benefited. When these two Stoics disagree, I
do not argue that Clement is a more trustworthy source than Stobaeus. However, the
existence of Clement’s passage offers another piece of evidence that Stobaeus’s
commitment could have been a mistake.
In brief, I argue that allowing that inferior people could be benefited offers a more
consistent picture of Stoicism. Although Stobaeus explicitly wrote that inferior
people could not be benefited, he either simply mischaracterized the Stoics’ ideas or
the Stoics themselves made a stronger contrast between sages and inferior people at
the cost of coherence. I argue that inferior people could be benefited for three
reasons. First, the evidence does not entail the claim that they cannot be. Second,
Stobaeus cannot explain a SIP interaction. Third, Stobaeus is in conflict with
Clement. From the last two sections, I have gathered three features of benefit from
the Stoics’ descriptions: (1) benefit is about virtue rather than indifferents; (2) benefit
is common; (3) inferior people and sages alike can receive benefit. In the next section,
I propose an interpretation in accordance with the above three descriptions and
explain why benefit is beneficial.
4. Understanding Benefit: Bridging Stoic Ethics and Cosmology
I argue that benefit furthers the agreement of nature. A virtuous action brings nature
into a state of agreement more than its alternatives could. Conversely, an inferior
action takes away others’ opportunity to perform a virtuous action, advancing
nature’s agreement less than its virtuous alternative could. Specifically, virtuous
27 Sextus Empiricus, “Against the professors”, 11.22–6, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 60G.
26 Clement, “The Teacher”, 1.8.63.1–2, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 60I.
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actions make people agree in everyday activities. Generally, virtuous actions help
inferior people progress towards virtue, thus furthering the universe’s agreement
towards the ultimate conflagration. I will first explain my interpretation, then28
support it with two arguments.
The ultimate agreement of nature consists in everything being virtuous. The Stoics
believed that nature would return periodically into a state of virtuous fire. Plutarch
wrote that “Whenever they [the Stoics] subject the world to conflagration, no evil at
all remains, but the whole is then prudent and wise”. At that time, everything29
agrees because everything is virtuous. However, this is not the case at the time this
paper is being written: at least part of the universe, namely the author himself, is an
inferior person who lacks virtues. With this difference, I propose a way to explain the
degree and progress of nature’s agreement, similar to how the Stoics explained an
individual’s progress towards virtue. Nature is said to be in more agreement, or
closer to the state of virtuous fire, if more members, such as individual human
beings, are virtuous.
This cosmological agreement of nature is compatible with Stoicism’s ethical end
(telos)—living in agreement with nature (homologoumenōs tēi phusei zēn). Diogenes
summarized Chrysippus’s explanation, “living in agreement with nature comes to
be the end, which is in accordance with the nature of oneself and that of the whole,
engaging in no activity wont to be forbidden by the universal law, which is the right
reason pervading everything and identical to Zeus, who is this director of the
administration of existing things”. Our ethical goal is to live according to nature’s30
plan. If we can do so and achieve virtue, we further nature’s agreement by making
more things virtuous. The benefit of virtuous actions can further be understood in
these terms.
The specific agreement of nature can manifest itself as concord among people. I wish
to emphasize that “[sages] are in agreement about matters concerned with life”.31
Virtuous actions are disjunctive when conflicts shall be avoided but concerted when
cooperation is preferred. Here is an illustration: Three different jobs (farmer,
blacksmith, and fisherman) are available for three sages (Eric, Frank, and Grace).
According to their nature, each sage should have a best option, and their options
shall not conflict. Since they are virtuous and wise, it will be easy for the sages to sort
out each other’s talents and preferences. Therefore, they act in agreement with
nature’s ideal plan. The order of action does not matter; when nature plans for Eric
to be a farmer, this plan is commonly known to the group. Frank and Grace will not
31 Ibid.
30 Diogenes, 7.87–9, in The Hellenisitic Philosophers, 63C.
29 Plutarch, “On Common Conceptions”, 1067A, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 43N.
28 The Stoics believe that our world will eventually return to a state of virtuous and intelligent
designing fire. See Section 3 “Physical Theory” of SEP entry Stoicism and Chapter 52 “Everlasting
Recurrence” of The Hellenistic Philosophers.
ISSN: 2653-3146
66
Cao Beyond the Soul and Virtue
choose to be a farmer even if they can choose before Eric. No matter what happens,
sages agree with each other, therefore they are in the best agreement with nature.
Thus, sages benefit each other by actualizing nature’s best plan.
Similarly, nature not being in agreement can manifest itself as discord among people.
Suppose the same task is assigned to three inferior people: Harry, Isabella, and John.
Nature’s ideal plan is inaccessible to all participants. Suppose Harry chooses first,
and if he was a sage, Harry should choose to be a fisherman. However, due to his
ignorance, Harry only has a one-in-three chance to pick the appropriate action. Thus,
it is quite likely that Harry chooses either Isabella’s or John’s best option. The
inferior people cannot manifest nature’s ideal plan without significant luck. They can
then become hostile: e.g., Isabella and John both want to be the blacksmith, so they
fight for it. However, the sages will never be in such a situation. Inferior people harm
each other by not furthering nature’s agreement, while also making nature agree less
when the inferior action is not an appropriate action. The illustration only considers
three inferior people, so some luck seems tolerable; however, many more agents are
involved in each real-world action. Therefore, it is extremely hard for inferior people
not to harm other people.
However, the agreement of nature is more abstract than in my illustrations; benefit
and harm have a deeper meaning than a superficial agreement. What ultimately
benefits everyone is the ideal world where everyone is virtuous, and nature is not in
complete agreement until then. When more people are virtuous, nature agrees32
better. Furthering nature’s agreement has a twofold meaning. Specifically, a sage
actualizes nature’s ideal plan at any given moment; generally, a sage helps people
progress in their virtue, ultimately bringing nature into a state of agreement.
“Furthermore we are driven by nature to desire to benefit as many people as
possible, and especially by giving instruction and handing on the principles of
prudence”. Cicero’s quote supports the more abstract notion of nature’s agreement.33
Sages wish to benefit people with the progress of their souls, which ultimately makes
nature in total agreement.
With virtue, a sage’s action is guaranteed to agree with nature. If an inferior person
acts in accordance with her vices, then very likely, nature’s ideal plan is “disrupted.”
The inferior person harms others with mismatches and conflicts. One potential
worry is that given the Stoic providentialist view of the universe, how can an action
benefit more? If non-virtuous actions are also part of nature’s plan, how can they still
harm? Would not all actions carry out nature’s ideal plan, and thus, are virtuous?
33 Cicero, “On Ends”, 3.62-8, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 57F.
32 Stoics also believed that we are already in the best possible world with God’s providence. (See Bett
2009, vol. 6, 392.) Please note that this belief is compatible with nature’s incompleteness, which is an
internal comparison among temporal stages within our world. However, the Stoic best possible world
belief concerns an external comparison with other possible worlds.
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According to Long and Sedley, “On the Stoic view determinism and moral
responsibility are not merely compatible, they actually presuppose each other”.34
Thus, I assume that human responsibility can be preserved, though it is possible that
the Stoics themselves were not consistent. With a potential solution to resolve the
tension between human responsibility and fate, a solution for the tension between
benefit and fate should be similar. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, I wish to
bracket the tension between benefit and determinism.
Since there is no extant definition of benefit in the primary sources, I cannot back my
interpretation with direct evidence. I propose my interpretation with two arguments.
First, the textual position suggests that benefit and concord are related. Second,
interpreting benefit with nature’s agreement satisfies the three characteristics
discussed in Sections 2 and 3. I do not argue that my interpretation is the only
possibility. It is possible to have another consistent interpretation that can satisfy all
three characteristics of benefit. In that case, I do not have any argument for my
interpretation beyond the textual position of Stobaeus’s discussion of concord.
However, no such interpretation yet exists in a well-known and acknowledged
format, and the logical space for benefit in the Stoic conceptual framework is not
very broad given the three confining characteristics. Therefore, I propose my
interpretation as a pioneering approach for the topic.
First, the textual position suggests that benefit and concord are related concepts.
While I do not argue they are identical, concord and benefit also share a tight
connection similar to the relations among good, virtue, and benefit. Stobaeus wrote
that:
[The Stoics] say that all good things belong <in common> to the virtuous, in that he
who benefits one of his neighbors also benefits himself. Concord (homonoia) is a
knowledge of common goods, and that is why all virtuous men are in concord with
each other, because they are in agreement about matters concerned with life. The
base [i.e., inferior] are enemies and do harm to each other and are hostile, because
they are in discord (diaphōnein) with each other.35
Stobaeus mentioned concord and discord between the discussions of benefits and
harms. The structure suggests that the concept of concord and discord is connected
to benefit and harm.
In addition, my interpretation satisfies all three characteristics of benefit. 1) This
account of benefit is related to virtue because only sages know for sure how to act in
agreement with nature. Right action is guaranteed to agree with nature. Indifferents
35 Stobaeus, “Anthology”, 2.11, in The Stoics Reader, 102.11b.
34 Long and Sedley 1987, Commentary on Ch. 62.
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cannot intrinsically benefit because indifferents cannot further nature’s agreement.
Sometimes preferred indifferents can be selected according to nature’s plan, but at
other times they do not. 2) Benefit and harm are common to everyone because there
is only one agreement of nature: advancing or disrupting its agreement affects
everyone simultaneously. Two sages can benefit without knowing each other
because they advance the agreement of nature, which is shared by the other. 3) Sages
and inferior people alike can be benefited because we share the same nature. In the
next section, I will compare and contrast my interpretation with an alternative
interpretation of benefit.
5. An Alternative Interpretation and Its Inadequacy
In the Glossary of the Stoics Reader, Inwood and Gerson wrote that “in Stoicism,
benefit is narrowly defined in terms of the attainment or preservation of a virtuous
state of one’s soul”. This interpretation follows Stobaeus’s description that inferior36
people cannot be benefited since they do not have a virtuous state of soul to be
attained or preserved. I have argued against this description in Section 3, showing
Inwood and Gerson’s interpretation is at least incomplete in that respect. In addition,
although they point out a crucial feature of benefit—it is narrowly about virtue and
souls, instead of the everyday “benefit” of indifferents—their definition is
inadequate because it cannot distinguish virtuous actions from the inferior ones.
Stoics did not only use benefit as a noun (ōpheleia) but also as a verb (ōphelein).
Therefore, benefit is a relation between people. Benefit is common: when one
benefits, each receiver has to be benefited. As a noun, benefit can be understood as
the attainment or preservation of virtue. One receives benefit if one’s virtue is
attained or preserved. As a verb, it is more obscure. Can a person preserve the
virtuous state of another person’s soul? I argue that one cannot. Imagine two sages,
Kiely and Laiken. Kiely performs a virtuous action, e.g., walking around prudently,
which should benefit all sages, including Laiken. According to Inwood and37
Gerson’s definition, Kiely helps Laiken either attain or preserve her virtue. Trivially,
Kiely cannot help Laiken attain virtue because Laiken was presupposed to be
virtuous. Therefore, Kiely must help Laiken preserve her virtue. I argue this is
impossible for two reasons. First, preservation assumes that virtues can be lost; if
not, all actions preserve virtue, making virtue preservation a meaningless tautology.
This assumption is contentious yet still possible. According to Diogenes,
“Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, on account of intoxication or depression,
37 I used walking prudently as an example for the ease of illustration. If a sage does an action, it is
guaranteed to be a right action. In addition, walking is one of the classical illustrations in the Stoic
discussions. For an example, see Stobaeus, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 59M.
36 Inwood and Gerson 2008, p. 206.
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but Cleanthes takes it to be irremovable owing to secure cognitions.” Though there38
is no extant elaboration on what does “intoxication or depression” mean, we could
reasonably assume that most actions done by inferior people cannot intoxicate or
depress a sage; otherwise, sages have quite volatile souls, which is against the Stoic
spirit that virtues come with fixity. Therefore, inferior actions cannot often39
endanger the virtuous state of a sage’s soul.
Second, can Kiely’s action preserve Laiken’s virtue any more than a random inferior
action? Imagine a counterfactual world in which an inferior person, Max, was
walking imprudently. Compared to the actual world, the state of Laiken’s soul is not
affected at all: whether their walk is prudent or not, Laiken can choose the
appropriate action (or the right action since she is a sage), i.e., the best available
walking route, for herself. Once a sage achieves virtue, she cannot easily lose the
virtue for its fixity. To contrast, consider an inferior person who performs many
appropriate actions, but does not have virtues yet. The inferior person’s state of soul
can be changed by others because she is not yet wise. The preservation of Laiken’s
virtue is irrelevant to Kiely’s or Max’s walking around because a sage’s soul is not
easily disturbed. If Max’s inferior action and Kiely’s virtuous action do not alter
Laiken’s virtuous soul, how can Kiely benefit Laiken while Max does not, under
Inwood and Gerson’s interpretation? Even if Chrysippus is correct, a sage can only
lose virtues in unusual circumstances, e.g., Max imprudently trips Laiken, and
Laiken’s head falls on a stone which happens to cause a severe concussion, and so
forth. If this ad hoc possibility is in a close possible world, Kiely’s prudent walk will
preserve Laiken’s virtue. However, we cannot expect a rare counterfactual case to
happen for each virtuous action. Therefore, a sage’s virtue does not have to be
constantly preserved.
If we interpret benefit as furthering the agreement of nature, then virtuous actions
can be distinguished from inferior actions. Suppose nature has an ideal plan for each
person to walk on a specific route. Kiely benefits Laiken by walking on her own
route instead of Laiken’s. Therefore, they achieve concord and are in agreement with
nature. If Nat, trying to study virtue, joins the sages walking around, it is easier for
him to choose his ideal route since the sages already rule out two possibilities for
him. Therefore, ultimately, Laiken and Kiely help Nat progress towards virtue. If the
inferior person Max joins their walking and imprudently takes Laiken’s route,
Laiken has to choose her second-best route. She can remain virtuous since a sage
should not be disturbed by another person’s walking. Laiken was not benefited
because of the lack of agreement. However, she was not harmed either because
ultimately, the lack of agreement and inferior population only remain: Max was not
virtuous in the first place.
39 See The Hellenistic Philosophers, 59I.
38 Diogenes, 7.127, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, 61I.
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In general, understanding benefit as preservation of virtue is inadequate because
virtue is stable. Sages do not need benefit to actively preserve their virtues at all
times. Thus, it is challenging to distinguish benefit from inferior actions. However,
agreement of nature is a common task requiring cooperation. Since a sage cannot do
everything by herself, my interpretation leaves space for the sages to receive benefits
from other sages. The agreement of nature is a more suitable candidate for benefit
than the attainment and preservation of virtue. I do not argue that one’s attainment
and preservation of virtue is excluded from the furthering of nature’s agreement.
The relation between the attainment of virtue and nature’s agreement is similar to
the relation between right actions and indifferents: a sage can prudently select some
preferred indifferents as a right action. Though indifferents are part of this action,
what makes this action virtuous is the sage’s virtue. Similarly, sometimes, sages can
benefit by helping others achieve virtues; but they do not have to. Benefit really
consists of advancing nature’s agreement, which is a guaranteed result from right
actions.
6. Conclusion
Although we do not have a passage explicitly defining benefit and explaining why it
is beneficial, we can reconstruct the concept with the Stoics’ descriptions. Benefit is
beneficial because it furthers nature’s agreement. My interpretation of benefit
suggests a strong connection between the virtuous state of the soul and the virtuous
state of nature, tying the Stoic ethical and cosmological theories together. Though
later Stoics appear to focus their philosophical interests solely on ethics, the earlier
Stoics treat other areas of philosophy, such as cosmology, on a par with ethics. The40
connection between cosmology and ethics in early Stoicism explains the unavoidable
inadequacy of interpreting benefit merely as the virtuous state of the soul. One
advantage of my interpretation is that nature’s agreement can be understood at
different levels: specifically, it is our everyday concord within the human
community; generally, it is the virtuous state of nature. Hence my interpretation
retains the Stoic emphasis on virtue over indifferents and captures the Stoic
comprehensive view of nature simultaneously.
40 Bett 2012, p. 530.
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